

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

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OIC-02 EB-07 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 ARAE-00 /076 W
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O R 151750Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3360

INFO USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 6 QUITO 7801

FOR ALL ARA POSTS EXCEPT QUITO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR OAS EC

SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE - ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM D. ROGERS
AND AMBASSADOR WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD

1. FOLLOWING IS THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WILLIAM D. ROGERS AND AMBASSADOR WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD IN QUITO,
ON THE MFM, ON NOVEMBER 12, 1974.

2. THAT IS ALL GOING TO BE, UNLESS MR. ROGERS, OR AMBASSADOR
MAILLIARD HAVE ANY REASON TO SAY OTHERWISE, ON THE RECORD. YOU
HAVE ATTRIBUTABLE DIRECTLY TO THEM AND YOU HAVE BIOGRAPHIES
AVAILABLE AND ANYTHING ELSE THAT WE CAN HELP YOU WITH, TITLES,
AND ALL THAT. MR. ROGERS, AS YOU KNOW, IS ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND AMBASSADOR
MAILLIARD IS THE UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO THE OAS, AND SO, THEY HAVE THE FLOOR. I
DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU HAVE A STATEMENT OR JUST WANT TO
ANSWER QUESTIONS OR WHAT, BILL?
NO. WE'LL ANSWER QUESTIONS.
DO YOU WANT TO CALL THEM OR DO YOU WANT ME TO?

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WHY DON'T YOU GO AHEAD AND CALL THEM?

ALRIGHT. ANITA?

(ANITA GUMPERT, AFP)

Q. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHERE YOU ARE GOING FROM HERE?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS.

A. BACK TO WASHINGTON. (LAUGHTER)

Q. ON THIS ISSUE, WHAT DO YOU FORESEE?

A. WELL, YOU MEAN ON THE CUBAN ISSUE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONCEPT? WELL, I WOULD SAY THAT SINCE THE RESOLUTION FAILED, ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE TREATY, THERE'S NO CHANGE IN THE LEGAL STATUS. WHAT MAY OCCUR IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS OF VARIOUS MEMBER COUNTRIES REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

(DAVID BELNAP - LOS ANGELES TIMES)

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK, MR. AMBASSADOR, MIGHT BE THE, ON THE BASIS OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT GOES ON INSIDE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, WHO DO YOU THINK, WHAT COUNTRIES DO YOU THINK, MIGHT DECIDE AS A RESULT OF HAVING FAILED TO GET THE 2/3 VOTE THEY WANTED HERE, MIGHT JUST GO AHEAD AND....

AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD:

A. WELL, I DON'T THINK I'D WANT TO NAME COUNTRIES -

A LOT OF STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND MONTHS OF SOME COUNTRIES THAT SAID NO MATTER WHETHER THE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED OR NOT THEY WOULD NOT RENEW RELATIONS. SOME OTHERS SAID THEY PROBABLY WOULD. I DON'T THINK ITS UP TO US TO SPECULATE ON WHAT ANOTHER SOVEREIGN NATION IS GOING TO DO.

Q. MR. ROGERS: IS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT THE CUBAN ISSUE MIGHT COME UP IN INTERVIEWING IN THE NEW DIALOGUE MEETING IN BA OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN APRIL?

A. YES. I SUPPOSE THE ANSWER IS THAT THERE'S A CHANCE THAT IT WILL. I DON'T THINK IT'S VERY LIKELY BUT THIS WILL NOT BE THE LAST TIME WE WILL HEAR THE CUBAN ISSUE OBVIOUSLY AND IT COULD COME UP IN A VARIETY OF FORA. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT THE RESOLUTION NO. 1 OF THE 1964 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL IS AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF RAISING CUBAN SANCTIONS IN A SPECIFIC MANNER UNDER SPECIFIC TERMS SET DOWN IN THAT VERY RESOLUTION. SO THAT THE RESOLUTION ITSELF ESTABLISHES ANOTHER FORUM IN WHICH THIS

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QUESTION CAN BE RAISED. AND THERE ARE WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER JURIDICAL WAYS THAT IT'S IMAGINABLE THE QUESTION WILL COME UP IN THE OAS ITSELF. FRANK?

FRANK MANITZAS - CBS

Q. MR. ROGERS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS AROUND. I ASSUME WITHIN THE DELEGATION AND THE OTHER FOREIGN DELEGATIONS AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT ACCEPT AT THIS MEETING. COULD YOU TELL US WHAT IT

WAS THAT WE MIGHT HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THEY NEVER OFFERED US?

A. WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY FALL-BACK POSITIONS, MR. MANITZAS.

I TAKE IT YOU'RE SAYING IN TERMS OF LIFTING THE SANCTIONS
ITSELF? NO. OUR POSTURE, OUR POSITION FROM THE VERY
BEGINNING, AND WE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THE OTHER
MEMBER STATES, WAS THAT WE WERE NOT OPPOSED TO THE CALLING
OF THIS MEETING IF THEY THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE, AT THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS LEVEL, THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO COME AND PARTICIPATE
AND LISTEN. WE ADOPTED THE POLICY FROM THE VERY OUTSET AND
CARRIED IT THROUGH WITH GREAT CARE OF NOT INFLUENCING OR
ARM-TWISTING ANY OTHER STATE WITH RESPECT TO THEIR POSITION
OR VOTE. THAT IS A POSITION WE HAVE FOLLOWED THROUGH ON
FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF THIS CONFERENCE. WE REGARD
THAT AS AN AFFIRMATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DIALOGUE ITSELF
AT THIS CONFERENCE AND THAT IS ESSENTIALLY THE POSITION WE
BROUGHT FROM THE BEGINNING YERFCKGRTUXAXU#
NCE#AND CARRIED
THROUGH TO THE END OF IT.

Q. THEN THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE THAT THEY COULD HAVE
OFFERED YOU IN THE RESOLUTION ON CUBA THAT YOU COULD
HAVE VOTED FOR - THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE
VOTED FOR?

A. WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY FALL-BACK POSITION THAT WE WERE
PREPARED TO ACCEPT ON THIS. WE WANTED TO LISTEN TO WHAT
EVERYONE HAD TO SAY AND TO SEE WHAT THE ESSENTIAL WEIGHT
OF OPINION WAS ON THE PART OF THE OTHER STATES.

Q. JOE OF THE WASHINGTON POST - NOVITSKY. MR. SECRETARY:
I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU, IF YOU WOULD, NOW, THE DEGREE
TO WHICH YOU MADE THIS CLEAR, YOUR DELEGATION'S POSITION OF
ABSTENTION FROM DEBATE AND ANY RESOLUTION, TO FOREIGN
MINISTERS WITH WHOM YOUR OR SECRETARY INGERSOLL MET HERE AND ON
WHAT DATES? WHAT I AM DRIVING AT IS THAT IT SEEMS TO HAVE
BEEN THE CASE THAT UNTIL SATURDAY, LATIN DELEGATIONS WERE
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NOT REALLY SURE OF THE POLICY YOU JUST DESCRIBED IN
VERY (UNINTELLIGIBLE) AND WE OURSELVES IN BRIEFING SESSIONS HERE
WERE BEING GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS A FALLBACK
POSITION AND THAT THERE WERE THINGS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN
DONE WHEREAS WE NOW KNOW, AS DO THE LATIN COUNTRIES, THAT
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO ABSTAIN AND THERE WAS NO CHANGE
IN THOSE INSTRUCTIONS.

NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3361

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A. THAT'S A FAIR QUESTION. I THINK I'D LIKE TO DIVIDE THE ANSWER UP INTO TWO PARTS, OR AT LEAST OUR POSITION UP INTO TWO PARTS BECAUSE WE THOUGHT ABOUT THAT VERY CAREFULLY. WHEN I SAY THAT I MEAN THE TIME WHEN WE WOULD ANNOUNCE THE FACT THAT WE WERE GOING TO ABSTAIN WITH RESPECT TO THE RESOLUTION DRAFTED IN WASHINGTON AND WHICH WAS ON THE TABLE HERE AT THIS MEETING. WE DID DECIDE AT THE VERY OUTSET THAT WE WOULD ADOPT WHAT I PERSONALLY REGARD AS A NEW AND HEALTHY POSTURE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT IS NOT TO PRESSURE ANY COUNTRY WITH RESPECT TO OUR POINT OF VIEW ABOUT THE ISSUES AT THE MEETING OR WITH RESPECT TO HOW THAT COUNTRY OUGHT TO VOTE. THAT POSTURE WE ANNOUNCED LONG BEFORE THE MEETING BEGAN AND AS I SAY WE FOLLOWED THROUGH THE ENTIRE MEETING BOTH IN THE HALLS OF THE MEETING ROOM ITSELF AND IN OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS, IN A MANNER WHICH WAS UTTERLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT NON-ARM TWISTING POSTURE BY THE UNITED STATES. WE DID NOT, YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT, ANNOUNCE BEFORE WE ARRIVED OR AT THE TIME WE ARRIVED, THAT WE WERE GOING TO ABSTAIN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. THE REASON FOR THAT WAS THAT HAD WE ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE GOING TO ABSTAIN WITH RESPECT TO THE PENDING RESOLUTION THAT WE

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THINK THAT THAT ITSELF WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH

THE NEUTRALITY OF NON-ARM TWISTING POLICY. BECAUSE THAT MIGHT HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON CERTAIN DELEGATIONS AND COMMITTED THEM TO A POSITION OF ABSTENTION BEFORE THEY HAD HEARD THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES. SO THAT ESSENTIALLY, OUR POSTURE WAS DIVIDED UP INTO THOSE TWO ASPECTS - ONE, OUR POLICY OF NON-ARM TWISTING, AND, TWO, THE FINAL VOTE WE WOULD TAKE AND THE FIRST PART WE ANNOUNCED AT THE VERY OFFSET. THE SECOND PART WE DID NOT ANNOUNCE UNTIL WE WERE SURE THAT EACH STATE HAD A CHANCE TO HEAR WHAT THE OTHERS HAD TO SAY AND HAD MADE UP ITS MIND AS TO HOW IT WAS GOING TO VOTE. IS THAT RESPONSIVE TO YOUR QUESTION?

Q. YES IT IS, SIR.

A. GOOD.

JUAN WALTE - UP

MR. ROGERS: WHEN DID YOU ACTUALLY MAKE UP YOUR MIND TO ABSTAIN? THIS MAY SOUND LIKE NIT-PICKING, BUT, HERE, WHILE COMING, OR TWO WEEKS AGO?

A. WELL, I THINK THAT'S A FAIR QUESTION AND LET ME TRY TO ANSWER AS QUICKLY AS I CAN. THE ANSWER IS THAT WE HAD, LET'S SAY, 90 PERCENT OR 80 PERCENT DECIDED TO ABSTAIN WITH RESPECT TO THAT RESOLUTION, THE ONE THAT HAD BEEN PREDRAFTED IN WASHINGTON AND WAS ON THE TABLE HERE. ASSUMING THAT WE WERE CORRECT IN OUR PROPHECY AS TO WHAT THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION WAS GOING TO BE AND WHAT THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS GOING TO BE, AND ASSUMING THAT NO OTHER NEW AND IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WERE PUT ON THE TABLE WHICH WE HADN'T FORESEEN. WHAT I'M TRYING TO SAY IS THAT WE WERE NOT LOCKED INTO THAT POSITION ABSOLUTELY HARD AND FAST AND HAD THIS MATTER, IN TERMS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATIONS, POSITIONS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS, OTHER FACTORS BEEN DIFFERENT THAT THEY FINALLY TURNED OUT TO BE THEN, WHY WE WOULD RECONSIDER THAT. IS THAT RESPONSIVE TO YOUR QUESTION JUAN?

ANITA GUMPERT, AFP,

Q MR. ROGERS: IF IT WERE A DIFFERENTLY WORDED RESOLUTION, COULD IT HAVE BEEN VOTED FOR?

A. THAT IS PRETTY HYPOTHETICAL, ANITA, IN TERMS OF SAYING WHAT, THE ONE THAT HAD TO REALLY HIT THE TABLE WITH A STRONG CONSENSUS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT. JOE?

JOE NOVITSKY:

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Q. EXCUSE ME, MR. SECRETARY, FOR PINNING THIS DOWN SLIGHTLY MORE, DID YOU OR AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD OR SECRETARY KISSINGER, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, AT ANY TIME, GIVE ANY TACIT OR PASSIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE SPONSORING COUNTRIES, OR GIVE TO THEM THE IMPRESSION BY SMILES OR (LAUGHTER) THAT YOU MIGHT SHIFT YOUR POSITION FROM ABSTENTION TO A FAVORABLE (LAUGHTER) UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. (LAUGHTER) IN OTHER WORDS, DID YOU GIVE THEM THE IMPRESSION AT ANY TIME THAT YOU OR

THE UNITED STATES OR STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE, WOULD HAVE BEEN GLAD TO SEE THE SANCTIONS LIFTED WITH STRICTLY LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT?

A. WELL, THESE ARE REALLY TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS, I THINK, WEREN'T THEY? THE FIRST QUESTION WAS, DID WE EVER SIGNAL TO THEM BOTH BY A SMILE OR A HINT, IN OTHER WORDS A KIND OF A BODY LANGUAGE DIPLOMACY. (LAUGHTER) I KNOW, THE ANSWER I HAVE TO GIVE YOU IS THAT WE DIDN'T INTEND TO. THE OTHER QUESTION IS WOULD WE HAVE BEEN HAPPY - WHAT?

Q. DID YOU?

A. DID WE? I DON'T HAVE THE FOGGIST IDEA, AS I SAY, I MAY HAVE SMILED AT THE WRONG TIME, IF I DID I APOLOGIZE IF I DID MISLED THEM. I DON'T KNOW. (LAUGHTER) YOU LEARN SOMETHING IN THIS DIPLOMATIC GAME ALL THE TIME.

DID YOU PREFER COMMENT ON THAT?

AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD: WELL, NO, I THINK THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. HOW THEY MAY HAVE INTERPRETED THINGS, I THINK IS A LITTLE DIFFICULT FOR US TO TELL. BUT, CERTAINLY AS FAR AS THE CO-SPONSORS WERE CONCERNED, WE TOLD THEM A LONG, LONG TIME AGO THAT THEY SHOULDN'T COUNT ON US FOR EITHER OPPOSITION OR SUPPORT.

Q. YOU TOLD THEM THAT SPECIFICALLY, SIR?

A. YES. VERY SPECIFICALLY. FRANK?

Q. MR. ROGERS, WE'VE SEEN THE NEW DIALOGUE WORKING HERE WITH NO ARM TWISTING, ETC., OR AT LEAST IT'S WHAT YOU SAY IT IS GOING ON. WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN WHEN YOU SEE THAT THEY HAVE THE 14 VOTES? WILL YOU STILL CONTINUE THIS NEW DIALOGUE OF SITTING BACK AND LET IT GO OR WAIT FOR THEM TO COME TO YOU. OR IS THE NEW DIALOGUE GOING TO HAVE CLAUSE THREE THAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS AND WE WILL MOVE OUT? IN OTHER WORDS, IN THIS CASE, YOU HAD A BETTER COUNT THAN THE SPONSORS. THERE WAS NEVER ANY NEED FOR YOU TO MOVE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT A POSITION WAS ADOPTED AGAINST THE POSITION THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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YOU WANTED. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU SEE THEY HAVE THE 14 VOTES? WHAT HAPPENS TO THIS NEW DIALOGUE THEN?

A. IF I UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION CORRECTLY, FRANK, IT IS WHAT WOULD BE OUR POSITION IN TERMS OF PRESSURE AND ARM TWISTING AND UNITED STATES POSTURE WHEN THERE ARE 14 VOTES TO LIFT THE SANCTIONS?

Q. WHEN THERE ARE 14 VOTES AGAINST THE POSITION THE UNITED STATES HAS? HOW ARE YOU GOING TO WORK THE NEW DIALOGUE?

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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3362

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OBVIOUSLY IT IS EASY TO SEE IT WORKING WHEN SOMEONE IS
DOING YOUR WORK FOR YOU, IN A SENSE, NOT SAYING YOU WERE HAVING
IT DONE FOR YOU, BUT THEY WERE DOING IT. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
YOU HAVE TO GO OUT AND START MOVING BODIES AND MOVING
VOTES YOURSELF. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO DO THIS WITH
THE NEW DIALOGUE?

A. WELL, I THINK YOU MISSTATE THE PROPOSITION, IN A SENSE,
FRANK. WE DIDN'T HAVE A POSITION. WE WERE NOT OPPOSED TO
A LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS. HAD WE BEEN OPPOSED, IF IT HAD
BEEN SOME OTHER MEASURE AND WE HAD BEEN OPPOSED TO, WE WOULD HAVE,
IN A NEW DIALOGUE WAY, FRANKLY WE WOULD HAVE STATED OUR POSITION
ON THIS MATTER. THAT'S PART OF THE NEW DIALOGUE AND EVERY
COUNTRY OUGHT TO SPEAK UP WITH RESPECT TO ITS OWN INTERESTS,
AND IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT OF
THIS CONFERENCE IS THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE A
POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS. WE
DID NOT. AND WE DIDN'T SAY TO ANY COUNTRY THAT WE DID. AND
WE DID NOT VOTE AGAINST IT. WE MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR TO THE
SPONSORS AND THEY UNDERSTOOD IT THAT THEY HAD A CLEAR FIELD.
THEY HAD A CLEAR SHORT AT LIFTING THOSE SANCTIONS IF
THEY COULD MAKE IT WORK. AND WE WERE NOT GOING TO LIFT A
FINGER AGAINST THEM. AND WE PLAYED BY THAT RULE FROM THE VERY
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BEGINNING TO THE VERY END. NOW, THAT ESSENTIALLY, IT SEEMS TO

ME IS PRECISELY CONSISTENT WITH THE NEW DIALOGUE. IF WE HAD A POSITION IN OPPOSITION THEY WOULD HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT AND YOU WOULD HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE IN ALL THE OTHER CONFERENCES IN THE PAST, AS YOU KNOW.

AMBASSADOR MAILLIAR:

AND THERE I HAVE SOMETHING FAIR TO ADD THAT YOU ALSO MADE AN ASSUMPTION - THAT YOU SAID THAT WE HAD A BETTER COUNT. WE DIDN'T KNOW FOR SURE WHETHER THERE WOULD BE 14 VOTES OR NOT.

VOICE OF AMERICA:

I'D LIKE TO PICK UP ON THE LAST PART OF THE LAST QUESTION, AND THAT IS ABOUT IF THEY HAD HAD THE 14 VOTES THEM THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE BEEN, IF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE THE SANCTIONS LIFTED- WITHOUT OUR HAVING TO CAST A VOTE IN FAVOR?

A. I'M NOT SURE...

Q. THE LAST PART OF THE LAST QUESTION HAD TO DO WITH THE UNITED STATES REALLY WOULD HAVE WELCOMED THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES HAVING TO COAST A VOTE IN FAVOR OF IT.

A. WE NEVER SAID THAT. BECAUSE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR POSITION.

Q. NO. BUT, NO, I KNOW YOU DIDN'T SAY IT, BUT WOULD IT BE FAIR TO SAY IT WOULD BE AN ASSUMPTION?

A. YOU WANT TO KNOW WHAT WAS IN OUR SECRET HEARTS?

Q. THAT'S RIGHT. A. THAT WOULD BE TELLING, WOULDN'T IT? NO, I DON'T MEAN TO BE CAPTIOUS ABOUT IT. GO AHEAD, BILL.

AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD:

A. I THINK THAT THERE IS SUCH A SIMPLE ANSWER TO THAT, IT MIGHT BE AS HARD TO BELIEVE. BUT IF 2/3 OF THE MEMBER STATES HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED, THEN I THINK YOU HAVE TO QUESTION WHETHER THERE WERE ANY SANCTIONS AT ALL. SO THAT THERE WASN'T A QUESTION OF WHERE OUR INTERESTS LAY. IT DEPENDED UPON THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION - IF THAT OVERWHELMING A MAJORITY OF THE LATINS FELT THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER AVIABLE POSITION, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRETTY FOOLISH FOR US, IT SEEMS TO ME, TO TAKE A CONTRARY VIEW.

RUDY RAUSCH - TIME MAGAZINE

Q. MR. ROGERS: HOW DO YOU VIEW THE EFFECTS OF THIS VOTE ON THE STRENGTH OF THE OAS? DO YOU THINK THAT THE OAS HAS BEEN-- UNCLASSIFIED

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THE POTENCY OF THE OAS HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THIS VOTE OR DO YOU THINK IT HAS BEEN A SETBACK FOR THE OAS? AND IN YOUR TALKS SINCE THE VOTE WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS, WHAT HAVE THEIR FEELINGS BEEN AS TO THE EFFECT OF THIS ON THE OAS?

A. (AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD) MR. ROGERS SUGGESTS THAT I ANSWER. I THINK THAT AGAIN YOU HAVE TO LOOK OUT FOR YOUR TERMINOLOGY A LITTLE BIT. THIS MEETING WAS CONVENED UNDER THE RIO TREATY. AND THE CONCERN, THE ONLY REASON THIS MEETING

WAS HELD, WAS BECAUSE OF THE CONCERN OF A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT THE BINDING OBLIGATIONS OF THE RIO TREATY APPEARED NOT TO BE BEING OBSERVED TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE AFTER ANOTHER--SEVERAL COUNTRIES DID NOT COMPLY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY AND I THINK THIS IS REALLY WHAT HAS CAUSED THE WHOLE THING TO OPERATE. SO, I THINK IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE RIO TREATY ALONE AND YOU'RE GOING TO BE CANDID, YOU'VE GOT TO SAY THAT IF NOW, EVEN THOUGH THE SANCTIONS ARE NOT LIFTED, AND AN APPRECIABLE NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES RENEW BILATERAL RELATIONS TO THIS EXTENT THAT THE RIO TREATY IS TO SOME EXTENT WEAKENED. BUT TO TRANSLATE THAT INTO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM, I THINK IS A VAST EXAGGERATION OF THE PROBLEM.

BILL NICHOLSON - ASSOCIATED PRESS

Q. MR. SECRETARY, AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, IS THE MARCH MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS GOING TO COME OFF AS SCHEDULED IN BUENOS AIRES, AND SECOND, WOULD THIS WHOLE BUSINESS COME UP AGAIN AT THAT MEETING?

A. YES. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE MARCH MEETING IS ON TRACK. WE LOOK FORWARD TO IT WITH A GREAT SENSE OF ANTICIPATION. THE SECRETARY WILL BE THERE. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING REAL NEW DIALOGUE ISSUES ACROSS THE BOARD. THE VAST NUMBER OF FUNDAMENTAL AND FIRST ORDER ISSUES THAT WERE ON THE AGENDAS, AS YOU KNOW, BOTH AT TLATELOLCO AND ATLANTA, WE DO NOT SEE THIS ONE ISSUE MEETING HERE AS HAVING ANY SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE MARCH MEETING IN BUENOS AIRES.

JIM PRINGLE - NEWSWEEK

Q. MR. ROGERS:

(QUESTION UNINTELLIGIBLE BUT CONCERNED PRINGLE'S CONTENTION THAT "COUNTRIES DEFEATED WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DEMOCRATIC AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS," AND COUNTRIES WHICH "WON" WERE "VASTLY MORE AGGRESSIVE"). DO YOU THINK THIS HAS HARMED THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM?

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A. WELL, I DON'T KNOW IF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IS HARMED BY WHETHER ONE CATEGORY OF COUNTRIES WIN OR ANOTHER CATEGORY OF COUNTRIES LOSE. THAT TENDS TO MAKE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES THAT I THINK IS NOT A SOLID BASIS FOR THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM AS AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD JUST HAS POINTED OUT IS THE STRUCTURE - THE JURIDICAL STRUCTURE - OF THE RIO TREATY ITSELF. THE RIO TREATY ITSELF, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, REQUIRED THAT THE SANCTIONS BE IMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF A 2/3 VOTE. AT THAT TIME THE PROPONENTS OF THE

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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3363

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FOR ALL ARA POSTS EXCEPT QUITO

SANCTIONS HAD THE UPHILL STRUGGLE OF GETTING 2/3. THEY GOT GOOD OR MORE THAN THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT VENEZUELA, ONE OF THE COUNTRIES, AS YOU KNOW NOW, A PROPONENT OF THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS FELT ITSELF, AND IN THAT POINT IN TIME, IT WAS ROMULO BENTANCOURT'S GOVERNMENT - ONE OF THE EMBATTLED DEMOCRACIES OF ALL TIME WHICH WAS OPERATING AS I WELL REMEBER UNDER THE THREAT OF MILITARY ATTACK OR GUERRILLA ATTACK ON THE ELECTIONS AT THAT TIME, WAS ROMULO BENTANCOUT'S GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS ONE OF THE INITIATORS OF THE SANCTIONS. AND THE SANCTIONS REQUIRED A 2/3 VOTE THEN. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE SAME RULE APPLIES TODAY UNDER THE RIO TREATY FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE AND 2/3 ARE REQUIRED TO LIFT IT AND THE FACT OF THE MATTER WAS THAT THE LIFTING OF THE MANDATED SANCTIONS UNDER RESOLUTION I OF THE 1964 MEETING COULD NOT COMMAND A 2/3 MAJORITY. NOW, THERE ARE LOTS OF THINGS YOU COULD SAY ABOUT THAT AND ONE OF THEM MAY WELL BE THAT THE JURIDICAL STRUCTURE OF THE RIO TREATY OUGHT TO BE CHANGED, AND WE ARE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO LOOK AT THAT QUESTION. BUT I DON'T THINK WE OUGHT TO TALK ABOUT THIS AS AN ULTIMATE AND DISTURBING DEFEAT FOR SOME PEOPLE AND A VICTORY FOR OTHERS. IT MAY

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INDICATE THAT WE GOT TO LOOK FOR BETTER WAYS FOR ARRIVING
AT CONSENSUSES WITHIN THE SYSTEM AND, AS I SAID, THE
UNITED STATES IS QUITE WELL PREPARED TO DO THAT.
JUAN WALTE - UP

Q. YES, I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION AT THE BA
MEETING.

ONE OF THE ISSUES THERE IS WHETHER OR NOT TO INVITE CUBA.
FIRST, HAVE YOU BEEN ASKED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOW YOU FEEL
ABOUT IT, AND HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?
A. THE ANSWER IS NO.

Q. THE SECOND HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?

A. WELL, I'LL WAIT TILL VIGNES ASKS THE SECRETARY.

DAVID BELNAP OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES:

MR. SECRETARY, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A THEORETICAL QUESTION.
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RIO TREATY THE SIGNATORIES ARE BOUND
BY THE DECISION OBVIOUSLY. IF THERE HAD
BEEN A 2/3 MAJORITY HERE IN FAVOR OF LIFTING THE
SANCTIONS, BOTH COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC, AGAINST CUBA, WOULD
THE UNITED STATES HAVE GONE ALONG AND RESUMED RELATIONS
IMMEDIATELY, OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME OF CUBA....

A. YES, THAT'S A FAIR QUESTION AND I THINK YOU'RE QUITE RIGHT
TO ASK IT IN A WAY WHICH EMPHASIZES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A
RESOLUTION HERE WHICH WOULD OBSTENTENTIALLY HAVE REPEALED THE
1964 RESOLUTION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
AND WHAT THEN HAPPENDS BILATERALLY. NOW, THE LEGAL EFFECT
OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH DIDN'T ACHIEVE THE 2/3 MAJORITY, THE 2/3
AT THIS MEETING WOULD HAVE ESSENTIALLY BEEN TO REPEAL THE
ADOPTION OF THE MEASURES BY THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS IN 64 WHICH BECAME BINDING ON ALL THE STATES IN OUR
LEGAL VIEW, BECAME BINDING ON ALL THE STATES; THAT THEY TERMINATE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; THAT THEY TERMINATE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS;
AND THAT THEY DO WHATEVER THEY CAN WITH RESPECT TO MARITIME
COMMERCE TO REDUCE TRADE WITH CUBA. THOSE WERE REQUIREMENTS
WHICH WERE AND STILL ARE, IN OUR VIEW, BINDING ON ALL MEMBER
STATES OF THE OAS. HAD THEY BEEN, HAD THOSE REQUIREMENTS BEEN
ELIMINATED, IT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN UP TO EACH COUNTRY
TO DECIDE WHAT THEN TO DO. THE UNITED STATES HAD
TERMINATED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND HAD INSTITUTED A NUMBER
OF MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMMERCIAL RELATIONS TO CUBA
PRIOR TO THE 1964 RESOLUTION AND BY THE SAME TOKEN THOSE
MEASURES, TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND
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MEASURES EFFECTING COMMERCE, WOULD HAVE LEGALLY SURVIVED THE
ACTION HERE AT QUITO, HAD THE RESOLUTION WHICH PROPOSED
GATHERED THE 2/3 VOTE. NOW, WHAT WE WOULD THEREAFTER HAD DONE,
BILATERALLY, IF YOU WILL, WITH CUBA, REALLY WOULD HAVE
ESSENTIALLY BEEN A CUBAN-U.S. QUESTION AND ESSENTIALLY IT STILL
IS ACUBAN-U.S. QUESTION. AND WE HAVE MADE NO STATEMENT

WITH RESPECT TO OUR POSTURE IN TERMS OF HOW QUICKLY WE
WOULD HAVE MOVED ON THAT ISSUE AND ON WHAT BASIS.

RICHARD O'MARA - BALTIMORE SUN

SECRETARY ROGERS: THE FORD ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID THAT THE
U.S. UNILATERALLY WOULD NOT RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITHOUT
CONSULTATION WITH THE OAS MEMBERS AND THAT WAS THE REASON
THIS MEETING WAS CALLED FOR. BUT NOW, WE ARE SORT OF BOUND IN
THE OTHER DIRECTION NOT TO FORGE DETENTE WITH CUBA. IN OTHER
WORDS, WE SORT OF BLOCK OFF THE WHOLE LIBERAL SECTOR OF THE
U.S. CONGRESS BY SEEING THIS RESOLUTION FAIL TODAY. COULD
THAT HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACHES?

A. I DON'T THINK SO. IT SEEMS TO ME WHAT YOUR SUGGESTION
IS THAT WE MANIPULATED THE RESULT HERE. AND WHAT I HAVE BEEN
TRYING TO SAY ALL DAY LONG IS THAT WE DID OUR BEST. WE MAY
HAVE FAILED, JUST BECAUSE WE ARE WHO WE ARE, BUT WE REALLY
DID OUR SERIOUS, LEGITIMATE BEST TO ELIMINATE ANY MANIPULATION
OR PRESSURE, OR ARM-TWISTING BY THE UNITED STATES. NOW YOU
MAY NOT CREDIT THAT, OR IT MAY SOUND, IN AN INTER-AMERICAN
CONTEXT, DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE, IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY WE ALL
KNOWN OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THIS RESPECT. BUT
IT IS THE CASE.

Q. WELL, YOU KNOW, THIS IS A VERY POSITIVE NEW STATEMENT.
IT COMES OUT VERY POSITIVE, BUT THE EFFECT OF YOUR POLICY
HAS HAD A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE OAS. SO I DON'T
SEE HOW YOU CAN CALL IT A POSITIVE POLICY WHEN ITS EFFECT
IS SO NEGATIVE.

A. WELL, AS I SAID, WE DON'T REGARD THE EFFECT AS NEGATIVE
ON THE OAS. WE HAD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, THERE ARE LOTS OF OTHER ISSUES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM. I REALIZE THAT CUBA IS THE BIG ISSUE THEATRICALY
AND IN TERMS OF PUBLIC CONTROVERSY. BUT, WE HAVE A LOT OF
OTHER THINGS THAT WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO TALK ABOUT IN
THE NEW DIALOGUE WAY WITH LATIN AMERICA AND WE THINK, IN A
SENSE, THAT THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION WE HAVE MADE TO
DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING TO DOMINATE
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THIS INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IN A WAY IN THE FUTURE, THAT WE
ARE NOT STRIVING FOR ARTIFICIAL CONSENSUSES; THAT WE ARE NOT
TRYING TO CREATE SYNTHETIC AGREEMENT. THIS IS A POSITIVE
CONTRIBUTION, NOT JUST TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE CUBAN ISSUE,
BUT TO THE DISCUSSION OF A WIDE NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES, MANY
OF THEM IN THE MINDS OF SOME PEOPLE MUCH MORE FUNDAMENTAL
THAN THIS CUBAN QUESTION. I WILL FURTHERMORE SAY THAT THIS IS NOT
THE LAST TIME, I REGRET TO SAY, THAT WE ARE GOING TO HEAR

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ACTION ARA-10

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NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-10

OIC-02 EB-07 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 /076 W

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O R 151750Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3364

INFO USIA WASHDC

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FOR ALL ARA POSTS EXCEPT QUITO

ABOUT THE CUBAN ISSUE IN THE THE INTER-AMERICAN CONTEXT OR
THE LAST OPPORTUNITY THAT THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IS GOING
TO HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS NARROWING QUESTION OF
SANCTIONS.

LATIN

Q. (SPANISH) (QUESTION SEMI-UNINTELLIGIBLE BUT CONCERNED
LATIN CORRESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT
COUNTRIES LIKE CHILE AND PARAGUAY HAD "WON" AND "DEMOCRATICALLY
ELECTED GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA HAD
LOST," AND WHAT EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM.)

A. I THINK ITS UNFAIR OR AT LEAST IT'S NOT A MATTER OF
SIGNIFICANCE WHICH COUNTRIES HAPPEN TO LINE UP ON THE SAME SIDE
OF THE VOTE. I THINK THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WAS
DETERMINED, AS I SAY, FOR THE REASONS THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO
MAKE CLEAR. THAT IS TO SAY, THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES
WAS TO AVOID PRESSURE AND ARM-TWISTING ON THIS CUBAN ISSUE. THE
REASONS THE OTHER COUNTRIES VOTED THE WAY THEY DID WERE EXPLAINED BY
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES. IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF
THAT THEY DID NOT VOTE THE WAY THEY DID JUST BECAUSE THE
UNITED STATES WAS VOTING THE WAY IT DID. THEY VOTED THE WAY
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THEY DID AS I THINK MINISTER BLANCO IN PARTICULAR EXPRESSED VERY CLEARLY, AS FAR AS URUGUAY WAS CONCERNED, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PERSUADED, THAT CUBA HAS AN EQUALLY NEUTRAL ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO INTERNAL AFFAIRS WITHIN URUGUAY. NOW THAT ESSENTIALLY IS THE REASON FOR THE URUGUAYAN POSITION. IN THE CASE OF ALL THE OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY TOOK THE POSITIONS THEY TOOK FOR THE REASONS THEY TOOK THEM, AND THE MERE FACT THAT COUNTRY IS IN ONE CATEGORY AND COUNTRY Y IS IN ANOTHER CATEGORY, I REGARD AS HAVING LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE.

MERWIN SEGALE OF THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

MR. SECRETARY: LET'S CARRY MR. O'MARAS QUESTION

A STEP FURTHER. WHATEVER THE SCENARIO MAY BE IN YOUR OWN MINDS IN WASHINGTON FOR DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA WHATEVER THAT TIMETABLE MAY BE, HAS IT NOW BEEN AFFECTED, HAS IT NOW BEEN SET BACK, OR ARE YOU NOW INCAPABLE OF MOVING AHEAD WITH WHATEVER YOU MIGHT, IN YOUR OWN MINDS, WANT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH BECAUSE OF THE DECISION TAKEN HERE TODAY?

A. WELL, QUITE FRANKLY, BECAUSE WE DIDN'T HAVE A TIMETABLE AND WE DON'T HAVE AN AGENDA FOR CUBAN RELATIONS. OUR BASIC POSITION IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE OAS RESOLUTION. AS I SAY, AS PRESIDENT FORD HAS SAID, AS WHEN AND TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR CUBAN POLICY CHANGES WE WILL BE DOING THAT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND CONSISTENT WITH ITS REGULATIONS. WE HAVE NOT HAD A TIME-TABLE NOR DO WE HAVE A FORMAL AGENDA FOR BUSINESS WITH CUBA. IS THAT RESPONSIVE TO YOUR QUESTION?

Q. CAN I CARRY IT ONE STEP FURTHER?

A. SURE.

Q. DOES THIS PREVENT YOU FROM ESTABLISHING ANY KIND OF TIME-TABLE; IN OTHER WORDS, DOES THAT QUESTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS NOW ABSOLUTELY GUIDE YOU WITH RESPECT TO THE OAS?

A. WELL THAT'S A FAIR QUESTION, AND IF I CAN ANSWER IT CANDIDLY WITHOUT YOU GUYS READING A LOT INTO THE ENTRAILS OF MY ANSWER, LET ME SAY THIS. AS A MATTER OF LAW, WE ARE FORBIDDEN, OBVIOUSLY, FROM HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA. THAT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, PROHIBIT US FROM CONSIDERING WHETHER TO ESTABLISH. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CAN THINK UNTHINKABLE THOUGHTS, EVEN THOUGH WE CAN'T DO ILLEGAL THINGS. OH, GOD, I'LL BE QUOTED ON THAT ONE, I CAN SEE IT.... (LAUGHTER) DON'T UNCLASSIFIED

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WRITE THAT DOWN.

MARY LOU KOESSLER - BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL

Q. SECRETARY ROGERS: COULD YOU GIVE US, SOME INFORMATION ON THE PRIORITIES

OF THE UNITED STATES VIS-A-VIS LATIN AMERICAN RIGHT NOW?

IT SEEMS THAT THE PROBLEMS WE ARE HAVING NOW ARE OVER

TRADE, OVER ECONOMIC, IN THE ECONOMIC FILDS.

IT SEEMS TO BE LESS POLITICAL WHICH MEANS THAT CUBA IS REALLY NOT ONE OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS. TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE SITUATION WITH THE MULTINATIONALS.

A. RIGHT. I THINK THAT'S A VERY GOOD QUESTION. I THINK IT DOES PUT THE ISSUES HERE SOMEWHETHER IN PERSPECTIVE. I'M NEVER SURE WHETHER IT'S AN EXPRESSION OF MY PERSONAL BOREDOM WITH THE CUBAN ISSUE OR A LEGITIMATE FEELING THAT THE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS REALLY ARE THE DOMINANT ONES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM TODAY. BUT, WHICHEVER THE REASON FOR MY FEELING ABOUT IT, I DO FEEL THAT WAY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THESE ARE THE REALLY GREAT ISSUES OF THE TIME. THEY ARE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED; THEY ARE ENORMOUSLY DETERMINATIVE OF THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA; THEY GET MUCH CLOSER, IN MY JUDGMENT, TO THE REALITIES OF LIFE IN THIS HEMISPHERE AND IN THE UNITED STATES THAN THE OBSTRUCTIONS OF THE CUBAN ISSUE; AND, THEREFORE, IN MY OWN TEMPERAMENTAL APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, ARE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THINK ABOUT NOW. WHAT ARE THEY? THEY ARE ESSENTIALLY THE ISSUES WE TEND TO LUMP UNDER THE HEADING ECONOMIC. BUT THEY RELATE TO A WIDE VARIETY OF THINGS. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE ISSUES THAT HAVE COME UP WITH RESPECT TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION. AS YOU KNOW, THE EARLIER MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS UNDER THE NEW DIALOGUE, THIS HAS BEEN A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO THEM. THEY INVOLVE ALL KINDS OF QUESTIONS RANGING FROM ACROSS THE BOARD INVESTMENT DISPUTES TO HONORING OF CONTRACTS AND A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER THINGS. THE QUESTION OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, WHICH IS A MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA, WHICHEVER FOREIGN MINISTERS YOU TALK TO AND ALL OUR AMBASSADORS REPORT BACK CONSTANTLY THIS REOCCUPATION WITH THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE. A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER QUESTIONS HAVING TO DO WITH ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS, PRICES OF RAW MATERIALS, INCLUDING PETROLEUM, AND ABVIOUSLY, THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION FOR SUCH UNCLASSIFIED

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ENORMOUS NUMBERS OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TODAY, AND THAT IS FOOD. THESE ARE THE ISSUES THAT WE ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO GET ON WITH WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. AND IT IS MY PROFOUND CONVICTION THAT WHATEVER THE DIAGNOSIS OF THIS QUITO MEETING. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE PRIORITY OF THOSE QUESTIONS, OR THE CAPACITY OF US IN THE HEMISPHERE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH IT. I SEE NO DIMINUTION HERE AND I HAVE TALKED TO A WIDE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-10

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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3365

INFO USIA WASHDC

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I SEE NO DIMINUTION IN THEIR DESIRE TO COME TO GRIPS
IN AN INTER-AMERICAN CONTEXT WITH THOSE FUNDAMENTAL
ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

THE BBC

Q. WHAT COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT THE UNITED STATES - THE
STATE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS TODAY'S DECISION. COULD
YOU SAY WHETHER IT IS HAPPY ABOUT IT AND PLEASED WITH THIS
DECISION?

A. NO. I DON'T THINK WE WANT TO CHARACTERIZE A RESPONSE
IN THAT SENSE.

MR. NICK LEVY - AP

Q. MR. SECRETARY: SUPPOSE SIX MONTHS FROM NOW THE UNITED
STATES WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN SUCH
A MEETING AS THIS AND SUPPOSE 2/3 OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE OAS OPPOSE?

A. THAT'S MARVELLOUSLY HYPOTHETICAL (LAUGHTER). WHAT WOULD HAPPEN?

I HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RULES AT PRESS CONFERENCE NEVER TO ANSWER A
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. BUT I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT,
TO POINT OUT, THAT THERE ARE A WIDE VARIETY OF WAYS IN WHICH
THE QUESTION OF THE RESOLUTION NO. 8 OF THE 1964 MEETING CAN
BE APPROACHED IN ADDITION TO THE KIND OF MEETING AT THE SUMMIT,
PRIME MINISTERS MEETING, THAT HAS BEEN HELD HERE.

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LE MONDE - ANITA GUMPERT

Q - UNINTELLIGIBLE

A. - HE'S THE EXPERT

AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD:

WELL, I MEAN THE PERMANENT COUNCIL IS CLEARLY AUTHORIZED TO DO THIS AND IS SITTING IN WASHINGTON ALL THE TIME.

SO ANY TIME THAT THEY GOT THE RIGHT NUMBER OF VOTES AND THIS COULD BE DONE EXPRESSLY UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE '64 RESOLUTION.

BUT THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ALSO CAN CONVOKE ITSELF INTO AN ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, MEETING PROVISIONALLY, SO THAT ANY-TIME THERE'S A WILL WITH THE NECESSARY 2/3 VOTE, IT COULD BE DONE VERY QUICKLY IF ANYBODY WANTS TO DO IT.

LE MONDE OF PARIS

MR. ROGERS: EVEN THOUGH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SEEM TO THINK THAT THERE ARE MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAN THE CUBAN ISSUE. THIS MEETING WAS TO CONSIDER THE CUBAN ISSUE. IF I LOOK UP MR. INGERSOLL'S DECLARATION THIS MORNING, I DON'T SEE VERY MUCH ABOUT CUBA AND ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES THINKS ABOUT CUBA. WHAT I SEE IS THE STATE OF AMERICA AS STILL.... (UNINTELLIGIBLE) MENTION THERE IS NO EASY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ...AND OTHERS MENTION.....

(UNINTELLIGIBLE)

A. DON'T YOU THINK WE MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION IN THESE AREAS BY KEEPING OUR MOUTHS SHUT ON THESE KINDS OF QUESTIONS SOMETIMES?

(UNINTELLIGIBLE)

A. WELL, I SUPPOSE THAT THE BEST ANSWER TO IT WAS, THE STATEMENT IN THE PRESS TODAY WHICH WAS ATTRIBUTED TO AN UNNAMED LATIN AMERICAN WHO SAID THAT WE DENOUNCE THE UNITED STATES WHEN IT PUSHES US AROUND AND WE DENOUNCE THE UNITED STATES WHEN IT DOESN'T. I QUESTION THIS CASE AND WE COULD EASILY HAVE TAKEN THE OTHER POSITION. WE COULD EASILY HAVE SPOKEN TO THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT ESSENTIALLY CASTRO WOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO AFFECT THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE. WE DECIDED NOT TO DO THAT. WE COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN BOTH POSTURES, THAT IS TO SAY, WE COULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED IT. WE COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OUR HANDS OFF POSTURE AND PRESSURE POSTURE, AND AT THE SAME TIME HAVE SPOKEN ON THE ISSUE THAT THE OTHER COUNTRIES DID. WE DECIDED AS A SAY, IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, TO ADOPT A HANDS-OFF NO-PRESSURE POLICY. AND, BASICALLY THAT WAS THE ATTITUDE WITH UNCLASSIFIED

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WHICH WE CAME TO THE MEETING AND STRUCK WITH ALL THE WAY THROUGH. FRANK; DID YOU HAVE A QUESTION?

Q. GIVE IT TO SOMEBODY ELSE (LAUGHTER)

Q. I'D STILL LIKE TO GO BACK TO THE QUESTION OF....

HOW DOES THIS POLICY WORK; YOU HAVE TO DISCUSS AND YOU HAVE TO MOVE, AND YOU HAVE TO LOBBY. WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO

CALL THIS NEW DIALOGUE? ARE WE GOING TO GO BACK TO 1962 THE WAY THE UNITED STATES WORKED THEN, OR HOW IS IT GOING TO WORK WHEN YOU'RE OBVIOUSLY THE UNDERDOG, BUT YOU WERE NOT THIS TIME.

A. WE DIDN'T FEEL....

Q. WELL, YOU DIDN'T CARE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

A. RIGHT.

Q. OK?

A. RIGHT?

Q. WELL, WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU'RE THE UNDERDOG. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO WORK THIS NEW DIALOGUE?

A. WELL WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO SPEAK UP, FRANK. BUT I THINK WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS CORRECT, OR AT LEAST I WOULD AFFIRM THAT WE TEND TO REGARD THE CUBAN ISSUE IN TERMS OF OUR POSTURE AS EVER SO MUCH MORE SENSITIVE THAN A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER ISSUES. IN OTHER WORDS, ON A WIDE VARIETY OF OTHER KINDS OF QUESTIONS - THE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WE WERE TALKING BEFORE - A NUMBER OF OTHER POLITICAL QUESTIONS. WE DON'T HAVE THIS SENSE THAT WE HAVE TO BE RESTRAINED. WE DON'T HAVE THIS FEELING THAT TAKING A POSITION ON THIS IS GOING TO TEND TO BE DOMINATING. WE DON'T HAVE THAT FEELING ON THE CUBAN QUESTION. AND THE HISTORY BEARS US OUT ON THAT. HISTORY ON THE CUBAN ISSUE ESSENTIALLY, HISTORY, IT SEEMS TO ME, OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN QUITE OUTSPOKEN. IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER THE HISTORY MAY HAVE BEEN, WE FEEL THAT THE CUBAN ISSUE IS A VERY SENSITIZED ONE AND WE FEEL THAT THE BEST CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE ON THAT WAS THE POLICY WHICH I'VE TRIED TO EXPLAIN HERE - OF RESTRAINT AND NO PRESSURE. WE WILL NOT FEEL THAT WAY WITH RESPECT AND NO PRESSURE. WE WILL NOT FEEL THAT WAY WITH RESPECT TO A LOT OF OTHER ISSUES, AND WE DON'T. WE SPEAK UP. IT'S NOT REALLY A QUESTION YOU'RE AN UNDERDOG-OVERDOG. MOST OF THE QUESTIONS THAT WE'RE DISCUSSING IN AN INTER-AMERICAN CONTEXT WE DON'T DISCUSS IN THE THEATRICAL WAY WE'VE DONE IT HERE IN QUITO THESE LAST FEW DAYS. WE DISCUSS IT IN SOMEWHAT MORE DIPLOMATIC FASHION AND IT UNCLASSIFIED

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DOESN'T WORK USUALLY BY ADDING UP THE VOTES ON A YES-NO-ABSTENTION KIND OF ARTIFICIAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. MOST PARTICULARLY, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' NEW DIALOGUE, THAT'S WAS ALL DONE BY CONSENSUS - THEY DON'T ADD UP VOTES. REALLY, IS THIS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR QUESTION?

LATINE

(SPANISH) LAST QUESTION DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIVE VALUE AND IS NOT REPORTED.

END OF CONFERENCE.

BREWSTER

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